Issue of
May 31, 2000
 
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Faculty Essay: Security
restrictions on research: a case of déjà vu
BY DONALD KENNEDY
It is strange how often
history repeats itself and stranger still how often our
memories fail to record its lessons. An excellent story (Stanford
Report, May 24) details how new applications
(misapplications would be more accurate) of the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations, or ITAR, have
barred Stanford scientists from participation in
fundamental university research if they come from certain
countries. What that account omits is that this has
happened before, right here at Stanford, in almost
exactly the same way after exaggerated claims about
thefts of secrets produced a national political
overreaction. Stanford was closely involved in the steps
that led, ultimately, to the Reagan Executive Order of
1985 that ended the previous bout of nonsense. That story
is worth telling for the lessons it may provide in the
current episode.
Related
Information:
Well before 1985 -- late
in 1981, actually -- the Department of State (and the
Department of Commerce, which had overlapping
responsibilities) began applying ITAR and EAR (Export
Administration Regulations), not just to military
hardware and specifications but to basic research data as
well. As a consequence, scientific visitors were
prohibited from attending symposia and meetings at which
such research findings were discussed, and their
university hosts were held responsible for guaranteeing
that the guests would not be exposed to certain kinds of
unclassified projects. This would have put Stanford in
the ridiculous position of having to monitor the travels
of Soviet visitors around laboratories here and there in
the Santa Clara Valley to make sure they weren't seeing
things they weren't supposed to. Obviously, the role of
Intourist lab-cop wasn't very appealing. Jerry Lieberman,
then vice provost for research and graduate studies and
later Stanford's provost, was as concerned as I, and we
began to work the problem together.
The Department of Defense
obviously had a significant role in this business,
because it involved research in which the department was
interested, both because it sponsored much of the work
and because it had a security interest in keeping some of
the work secret. At the time, the undersecretary of
defense for research and engineering was Dick DeLauer,
once upon a time a catcher on the Stanford baseball team.
He and I co-chaired something called the DoD-Universities
Forum, a committee of sorts that had been put together to
improve relationships between the academic community and
the Defense Department on just such issues.
DeLauer understood the
problem quite well and wanted to be helpful. The
assistant secretary in charge of policy at Defense,
Richard Perle, understood it just as well -- but,
unfortunately, he did not share our view at all. (Indeed,
in a subsequent debate with me at the Washington Press
Club, he demanded to know why universities like Stanford
wouldn't take classified research!) The struggle within
Defense, of course, took place out of my sight, but
Secretary Weinberger apparently sided with DeLauer. In
any event, the State Department stopped asking us to be
chaperones. Helped by a decision in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals (U.S. vs. Edler Industries),
State also limited the kinds of data to which the ITAR
rules would be applied: Fundamental research was to be
left alone, and only technical data significantly and
directly related to specific items on the munitions list
would be subject to regulation.
That eased the short-term
problem, but the struggle was hardly over. Plainly a more
permanent solution was desirable. With some urging from
us, the National Academy of Sciences agreed to take on
the issue and formed a distinguished committee under the
leadership of physicist Dale Corson, president emeritus
of Cornell University. The Corson committee developed a
careful set of definitions that would exempt basic
research from ITAR regulation, but recognized a narrow
"gray zone" of dual-use technologies. That led
eventually to Reagan's National Security Defense
Directive 189, referred to in the article, which created
the desired safe harbor for fundamental research.
I published an editorial
in Science in April 1982 titled "The
Government, Secrecy and University Research." I hate
people who quote themselves, but in this case it is
irresistible for two reasons. First, setting out this
aged rationale may be useful in the present dispute with
the government. Second, and somewhat ironically, this
sorry business has reemerged just when I'm writing
another editorial on a different subject for Science,
my first as an employee! So here is the last part of the
old one:
"If a Soviet
scientist is viewed with such alarm that universities
must be asked to police his visit, then the Department of
State can apply visa controls. And if a technology has
such military value that exposure in an open environment
presents clear risks to national security, the government
can classify the technology thereby permitting the
universities to decide in advance whether they can accept
the restrictions that come along with the work. But to
apply a burdensome set of regulations to a venture that
has gained such great strength through its openness will
cost the nation more than it can be worth."
Would I change a word, 18
years later? Maybe one: Substitute "Chinese"
for "Soviet." But that's about it. The more
things change, the more they stay the same. SR
Donald Kennedy is
president emeritus and Bing Professor of Environmental
Science.
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